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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL HILL, by and through 
his guardian ad li tern, 
JAMES L. HILL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 




Case No. 9687 
RESPONDEN'T'S BRIEF 
STATEMEN'T OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for per-
sonal injury arising out of an auto accident. 
DISPOSITION IN THE DOWER COURT 
The jury answered questions to a special ver-
dict on the basis of which the court entered judg-
ment in favor of the defendants. A motion for new 
trial was made and denied. 
RELIEF SOU'GHT ON APPEAL 
Plain tiff seeks a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF F A:CTS 
The accident occurred on the morning of Aug-
gust 8, 1961, on Kearns Boulevard (5415 South) 
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between 4220 West and 4320 West, (R. 25, 85). 
The plaintiff, Paul Hill, was 11 years of age on 
July 13, 1961, (R. 53). The defendant, Rex Cloward, 
at the time and place of the accident was driving 
a 1958 International one-half ton truck, ( R. 14). 
The truck had running boards on either side which 
were concealed and completely covered by the cab 
doors when the same were closed. Back of the cab 
and in front of the bed on the left side of the truck 
there was a little platform or running board about 
a foot long. There was a refrigerated box in the 
back of the bed of the truck in which ice cream 
products were carried. This box was right up against 
the cab of the truck. One side of the box was tight 
against the side of the truck and on the other side 
there was about six inches between the box and 
the side of the truck. There was thirty six inches 
between the back of the box and the tail gate, ( R. 
79, 80, 81). The truck had a music m~achine and 
played different tunes. It was used for the sale 
of ice cream products, (R. 17, 20, 21). It was ad-
mitted by the answer that Rex Cloward at the time 
and place of the accident was ~acting as an agent 
an'd employee of the defendant, Rubin McDougal, 
(R. 4). 
The plaintiff's home was located at 4309 West 
5500 South in Kearns, ( R. :54). The defendant, 
Cloward, was proceeding west in the truck on 5500 
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South selling ice cream when the plaintiff and an-
other boy, Bruce Davenport, came out and asked 
for some free ice cream. Cloward stopped in front 
of the Hill home, ( R. 73, 7 4). He saw Bruce Daven-
port get on the little platform back of the cab on 
the left side of the truck, but according to him the 
plaintiff went to the back of the truck, (R. 74, 82). 
He did not at any time see the plaintiff on the 
platform, ( R. 75). Davenport got off the truck 
before Cloward started up, (R. 82). At that time 
according to Cloward the Hill boy was in the area 
back of the truck and out of his vision, (R. 82). 
He was definitely not on the little platform or run-
ning board, ( R. 83). Cloward proceeded slowly west 
and according to him when he got to a dip in the 
road at 4360 West, he heard the plaintiff say he 
wanted to get off. This was the first time he knew 
that the plaintiff was on the truck, (R. 83). He 
slowed down to 5 or 10 miles per hour. He could 
still not see the plaintiff, ( R. 83), but to lid him he 
would let him off at the stop sign at the Kearns 
Boulevard, ( R. 84). He then made a right turn on 
4420 West and proceeded north to the stop sign 
at Kearns Boulevard which according to plaintiff's 
Exhibit P-2 is a distance of approximately a block, 
(R. 84). He came to 1a complete stop and at that 
time did not see the plain tiff on the truck and as-
sumed that he got _off, (R. 84). l-Ie turned right 
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and started off fairly slow as he made a right turn 
to proceed east on Kearns Boulevard, ( R. 85). From 
that time on he did not hear the plaintiff say any-
thing until he heard a yell and observed someone 
lying on the road behind the truck. He did not know 
it was the plaintiff but thought someone was trying 
to play a prank on him and continued on, (R. 85-
86). At this time he was traveling between 20-25 
miles per hour, (R. 78). He did not know that the 
boy was on any part of the truck after he left the 
stop sign and had no intent to scare or frighten 
him, (R. 87). 
Cloward informed the investigating officer, 
Pearce, that he thought the plaintiff had got off 
at the stop sign, ( R. 31). The plain tiff admitted 
that he knew it wasn't safe to ride where he claimed 
to be riding on the little pliatform on the left side 
of the truck, (R. 61). He had attended safety lec-
tures in ~hool before the accident and his parents 
had taught him it was dangerous to ride on ve-
hicles, (R. 62). The plaintiff further admitted that 
the truck came to a full and complete stop on 4420 
West at the stop sign at Kearns Boulevard and he 
"had plenty of time to get off," (R. 63). He ad-
mitted the only reason he didn't get off was because 
he thought the defendant, Cloward, was going to 
take him back home, ( R. 63). Yet he never asked 
the defendant, Cloward, to take him home, and the 
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defendant, Cloward, never told him that he would 
do so, ( R. 64). The plaintiff also admitted that 
he did not in fact know whether he '''jumped, fell 
or slipped" from the truck, (R. 67). The investigat-
ing offficer, Pearce, testified that the plaintiff told 
him that he didn't know whether "he slipped, fell 
or baled off the truck," ( R. 31) and the plaintiff 
admitted telling the officer this, ( R. 67). 'The in-
vestigating officer testified that the plaintiff got 
up from the street and ran to his home, ( R. 2·6). 
The plain tiff sustained some bruises and abra-
sions and a fractured left clavicle, ( R. 38, 39). The 
Clavicle was treated by a Figure 8 splint which 
is shown on the plaintiff's exhibits P-1 and P-4, 
(R. 39). !The splint remained on for five weeks, (R. 
42). The doctor saw the plaintiff a total of five 
tin1es, ( R. 43) . His total doctor bill including X-
rays was $82.50, (R. 44). The doctor admitted 
that the bruises and abrasions cleared up without 
incident and that the plaintiff was discharged from 
his treatment on September 1'2, (R. 45, 46); that 
the plaintiff had no functional disability and could 
use his arm and shoulder to the full extent 'as be-
fore and was free from pain, ( R. 46, 4 7, 51). The 
doctor also testified "he could use his arm quite 
well in two weeks even with the splint on." (R. 48). 
The plaintiff started school which was either in 
the last week of August or the first of September 
and continued school regularly thereafter, (R. 68). 
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The ~action was originally brought in the minor's 
name only through his guardian ad li tern, James L. 
Hill. However, during the course of the trial the 
court took the position that the minor could not 
recover the amount of the doctor bill; that this was 
properly the father's claim. It was then stipulated 
by both counsel that the father be made a party to 
the action, and if the plaintiff won a judgment, 
that judgment in addition would be entered in favor 
of the father for the· amount of the special dam-
ages, to-wit: $82.50, and that in the event the minor 
lost the case the father would be bound by the 
judgment, (R. 93). 
ARGU'MEN·T 
POINT I. 
DE'FENDANT'S REMARKS CONCERNING IN-
SURANCE DID NOT INDICATE LACK OF INSUR-
ANCE AND IN NO EVENT CONSTITUTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR. 
At the outset, it should be borne in mind that 
the witness, Rubin McDougal, was the first witness 
called by the plaintiff. The jury had just been sel-
ected, opening statements had been made, and at 
11:16 A.M. Mr. McDougal was called as an adverse 
witness, '(R. 13). The statment of which the plain-
tiff complains occurred within about the first five 
minutes of Mr. M·cDougal's testimony. The plain-
tiff's attorney did not move for ~a mistrial or seek 
to correct any alleged error or do any thing what-
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soever, but proceeded directly on with the case. His 
second witness, Richard B. Pearce, was called, and 
his testimony was completed by 11:53 A.M., (R. 
36). 
The plaintiff complains that the defendant Mc-
Dougal's testimony indicated that he had no insur-
ance on the vehicle at the time of the accident. The 
defendant's testimony in this regard was: : "I have 
no insurance on it at the present time." It was our 
opinion that the defendant, by such testimony, had 
clearly indicated to the jury that he did have in-
surance on his vehicle at the time of the accident, 
but since he did not have insurance on it at the time 
of the trial, he would not assume the responsibility 
of driving the vehicle. 'This was also the in terpre-
tation placed upon the testimony by the trial judge 
in 1·uling upon the pl1aintiff's motion for a new 
trial. The trial court took the position that the testi-
mony could not have prejudiced the plaintiff but 
in fact prejudiced the defendant as indicating that 
the vehicle \Vas covered with insurance at the time 
of the accident. We submit that this is the only reas-
onable interpretation that can be made of the testi-
mony. Viewed in such light, it certainly could not 
haYe been prejudicial to the plaintiff. In fact, the 
plaintiff must not have considered the testimony 
as prejudicial because he made no attempt to ex-
amine the defendant to clarify the matter, nor did 
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he ask the court for a mistrial or for any caution-
ary instruction. His argument at this time is an 
after-thought and should have no merit. 
The plaintiff contends that it is common knowl-
edge in the State of Utah that in the event of a 
motor vehicle 'accident if the owner is not insured, he 
has to post a bond or his license plates are taken 
away frmn him. In this connection, he argues that 
since the defendant testified he did not· have any 
license plates on the vehicle, the only interpretation 
which could be derived from the statement was that 
his car was not insured at the time of the accident 
and his license plates had been taken away from 
him. 'The most obvious answer to this line of reason-
ing is that the plaintiff at the time of the trial could 
have questioned the defendant concerning the reason 
for his failure to have any license plates on the 
vehicle. Such testimony, if pursued, would have 
clearly indicated that the vehicle did have li-
cense plates on it; that the defendant placed the 
vehicle on a used car lot for sale; that subsequently 
the vehicle was removed to his brother's place and 
used on his brother's premises and that the de-
fendant did not know whether the vehicle actuany 
was licensed at the time or not. He knew he had 
no't licensed it for 1962. The vehicle, in fact when 
produced for the inspection of the jury did have 
1961 license plates on it. 'The defendant was under 
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a mistaken apprehension when he thought the ve-
hicle was not licensed at the time of the trial. The 
plaintiff should not complain of something which 
he could readily have cleared up by his own exain-
ination had he felt that there was any merit to the 
argument which he is now pursuing. The defendant 
was the cautious type of individual which his testi-
mony indicated because even though he did not have 
any insurance on the truck at the time of the trial, 
during the noon recess he called his insurance broker 
and arranged for a rider to be placed upon the ve-
hicle to cover it with insurance so that he would 
not have to drive it to court without having it in-
sured. He had merely permitted his insurance to 
lapse after the accident because he was not using 
the vehicle and either had it on a used car lot for 
sale or ~n his brother's premises. 
Assuming for the purpose of argument that 
the statement made by the witness indicated a lack 
of insurance on the vehicle at the time of the acci-
dent, nonetheless, the law is well recognized that 
a party litigant may waive or be deemed to have 
waived his right to complain by failing to make 
appropriate objection or take proper motion at the 
time to seek to have the defect cured. This would 
seem to be particularly true in a case of this nature 
where the alleged error occurred in the opening 
n1inutes of the trial, where if the plaintiff felt he 
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was entitled to a mistrial, he could have made a 
1notion and the jury could have been discharged and 
the case started over right then without any delay 
or the plaintiff could have pursued the matter by 
question and ~answer to develop what he now wants 
the court to erroneously assume regarding the lack 
of license plates and lack of insurance on the ve-
hicle at the time of the trial. 
In the case of Grahm v. Wriston, (W. V.) 120 
S. E. (2d) 713, cited by appellant, counsel for de-
fendant in his closing rargument strongly implied 
that the defendant was not insured at the time of 
the accident when he knew that he was. This is dif-
ferent from our case in that the defendant's coun-
sel voluntarily made the statement in his closing 
argument and used it to his advantage and at a 
time when there was little that the plaintiff could 
do to correct the error. In our ·case there was no 
statement that the defendant did not have any in-
surance at the time of the accident and any state-
ment concerning insurance was made at the very 
outset when it could have 'been easily cured or cor-
rected or plaintiff could have moved for a mistrial 
and no del'ay would have been encountered. 
See 39 Am. Jur. Section 14, page 39, where 
it is stated: 
"* * * It is also a well-recognized and fre-
quently applied principle that a party liti-
10 
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gant will be deemed to have waived, or will 
be considered as being estopped to rely upon, 
matters constituting grounds of new trial 
which come to his attention or knowledge 
during the course of trial, or of which he 
should, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
have acquired knowledge, where he fails to 
make objection at the time and seek to have 
the defects cured. In other words, one is not 
entitled to a new tri1al when it appears that 
he had knowledge of the irregularity of which 
he com pains and did not promptly seek to 
have the defect corrected at the trial of the 
case, or that his failure to obtain such knowl-
edge and have defect corrected, was due to his 
own fault or lack of diligence. Thus, a party 
who is aware of any fact or circumstance 
affecting the qualification or competency of a 
juror, but fails to m1ake objection when the 
juror is sworn, or who, by reason of his own 
lack of diligence, fails to discover the juror's 
want of competency or qualification, cannot 
assert the existence of that fact as a ground 
for a new trial. It is equally well settled that a 
party litigant who acquires knowledge of mis-
conduct on the part of a juror during the 
course of trial or of misconduct of his oppon-
ent, his counsel, or the court, directly affecting 
a juror, and fails to make objection thereto and 
seek a remedy at the time, or by lack of dili-
gence fails to acquire knowledge of such mis-
conduct in time to m~ake objection before ver-
dict, is deemed to waive his right to assert 
that as a ground for a new trial. * * *" 
See also 39 Am. Jur. Section 95, page 110: 
uThe defeated party may waive his right 
to a new trial on account of misconduct affect-
ing the jury if, after knowledge thereof, he 
11 
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goes on with the trial without objection. The 
general rule is that misconduct on the part 
of anyone in connection with the jury after 
their retirement, although it is of a character 
which might vitiate the verdict if brought to 
the attention of the court by timely complaint, 
is not available, after the return of the ver-
dict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, 
where it was known to the defendant or bis 
counsel before the return of the verdict." 
Furthermore, the defendant's testimony as in-
dicated by the appellant in his brief was not elicited 
by either counsel but was brought out in response 
to questions made by the court. By weight of auth-
ority an irresponsive or inadvertent 1answer to a 
question which calls for proper answer is not ground 
for declaring a mistrial. See 4 A.L.'R. ('2d) p. 784. 
See Brazeale v. Piedmont Mfg. Co., (S.C.) 192 
S.E. 39, wherein the court said: 
"* * * Where improper reference is made to 
insurance, or an insurance agent, by the wit-
ness 1as was here done, and for which the 
plaintiff is not responsible, it seems that the 
only remedy that the court can give is to 
grant a motion to strike out the objectionable 
testimony and to instruct the jury to disre-
gard it." 
Certainly, in our case it is admitted that the 
defendant's counsel had nothing to do with the 
bringing out of the inform1ation to which objection 
is now being made. See also 21 Appleman Insurance 
Law & Practice, Section 12834 page 806: 
12 
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"It is not every casual or inadYertent 
reference to an insurance company in the 
course of trial that will necessitate a mistrial. 
Whether the disclosure is such as to consti-
tute error depends essentially upon the facts 
and circumstances peculiar to the case under 
consideration. And whether the jury should be 
discharged following such a disclosure de-
pends generally upon whether there was good 
or bad fiaith in the injection of the question 
of insurance. 
"A mistrial is generally granted only 
where the plain tiff's counsel or witness has 
deliberately or wilfully undertaken to inform 
the jury of insurance, such as where there is 
an avowed purpose 'and successful attempt, 
and not where the information comes in inci-
dentally in attempting to prove other facts or 
where the particular answer was not sought 
or anticipated. The rule of prejudicial error 
has no 'application where the evidence is in-
troduced by the complaining party. The rule 
also does not apply where the information is 
innocently volunteered by a witness, or is in-
terjected by an unresponsive answer to a 
proper question." 
See also Burton v. Zions Cooperative M ercan-
tile Institution, 12'2 Utah 360, '249 Pac. '514. In that 
case certain remarks were made before the jury 
panel by a prospective juror on voir dire examina-
tion to the effect that in his experience insurance 
companies were very fair and made settlement wher-
ever due, and that if such companies denied settle-
ment, he felt they would have some ground for such 
13 
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refusal. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that that remark did not warrant reversal of order 
denying plaintiff's motion for mistrial. Justice 
Crockett in writing the majority opinion said: 
"Once the trial court has exercised his 
discretion and made his judgment thereon, 
the prerogative of this court on review is 
much more limited. If the trial court could 
reasonably decide that the jury would not be 
prejudiced and that the parties could have a 
flair trial, his ruling must stand. In other 
words, unless his determination appears to 
be so unreasonable that upon review it ap-
pears that he was plainly wrong, in that there 
is a strong likelihood that the plaintiff could 
not have had a fair trial, we cannot say that 
his failure to grant one was an abuse of dis-
cretion. The rna tter rests in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court and the judgment there-
on should be reversed only where there has 
been a plain abuse thereof. 
"'The foundation of this rule is the same 
as in numerous other areas of the law where-
in appellate courts give deference to rulings 
of the trial court because his judgment must 
rest in large part upon his observance of the 
conduct, personalities and circumstances with 
which he has close con tact. He s'ees and hears 
the participants; the manner in which they 
act and speak; sees their expressions, hears 
the inflections of the voice and has the oppor-
tunity to observe their reactions much better 
than can be demonstrated to an appellate tri-
bunal from a cold record of the events." 
In this case the lower court had occasion to 
14 
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observe the manner in \vhich the testimony was 
given, the effect, if any, which it had upon the 
jury, and in his opinion the testimony was not pre-
judicial to the plaintiff but in fact was prejudicial 
to the defendant as indicating that the defendant 
carried insurance at the time of the accident. 
As indicated by Justice Crockett in the Utah 
case, aforementioned, the burden was on the plain-
tiff to show affirmatively that there was an error 
and that it was prejudicial. '~There is a presumption 
that the judgment of the trial court was correct, 
and every reasonable intendment must be indulged 
in favor of it; the burden of affirmatively showing 
error is on the party complaining thereof." 
If we are going to indulge in assumptions, 
which is what the plaintiff has done in his brief, 
then the jury could well have assumed that there 
was insurance on the vehicle in view of the Utah 
Financial Responsibility Law which most people 
construe as absolutely requiring vehicles to be in-
sured. 
In summary, it is our position that the state-
ment made by the defendant indicated that he had 
insurance on the vehicle at the time of the accident 
but not at the time of the trial. If there was any 
error, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to call it 
to the court's attention, attempt to have it corrected, 
15 
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or move for a mistrial, none of which he did. He 
should not be permi ted to go through the case and 
then when the judgment did not meet with his ap-
proval attempt to have it set aside. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 14-A WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL AND WAS NOT GIVEN IN SUCH A 
MANNER AS TO BE DETRfMENTAL TO THE 'PLAIN-
TIFF. 
It is true that after the case had been concluded 
1and arguments made by counsel to the jury, that 
the trial court indicated that he was going to give 
one more instruction which was designated 14-A 
and which reads as follows: 
"No. 14-A. No person shall ride, and no per-
son driving a motor vehicle shall knowingly 
permit any person to ride, upon any portion 
of any vehicle not designed or in tended for 
the use of passengers. In this case it is un-
disputed that the plaintiff was riding on the 
vehicle at a place neither designed nor in-
tended for the use of passengers. If, therefore, 
you find from a... preponderance of the evi-
dence that the. plaintiff, considering his age, 
in telligenae and experience, knew or in the 
exercise of due care should have known that 
it was dangerous to ride or attempt to ride 
on the vehicle in the manner in which he was 
attempting to do, then and in that event you 
are instructed that the plaintiff was negli-
gent." (R. 90, 91) 
It is the plaintiff's contention that the giving 
of this instruction after the argument to the jury 
16 
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deprived plaintiff's counsel of the right to review 
the instruction with the trial court 1and other coun-
sel, gave special emphasis to the instruction and 
amounted to a directed verdict. The plain tiff does 
not contend that the instruction was erroneous or 
that it did not properly state the law. Therefore, 
he could not have been prejudiced in not having an 
opportunity to review the instruction with the tri1al 
court and other counsel. 
The plain tiff was not taken by surprise. The 
instruction as given was the defendant's requested 
instruction No. 12. The pre-trial order which plain-
tiff had incorporated in the record on appeal refers 
to the issues as set forth in the pre-trial statements 
which the plaintiff did not have made a part of the 
record. In the defendants' pre-trial statement, copy 
of which had been served on the plaintiff's attorney 
prior to the time of the pre-trial hearing, the de-
fendants set forth the following items of contri-
butory negligence on the part of the plaintiff minor: 
"(a) Negligently and unlawfully and with-
out permission riding on some portion 
of the defendants' vehicle; 
(b) Negligently failing to get off said ve-
hicle after it stopped prior to the acci-
dent at which time the plaintiff minor 
had ample opportunity to remove him-
self from said vehicle ; 
(c) Negligently riding in a dangerous place 
on said vehicle and without permission; 
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(d) Negligently failing to take any proper 
precautions for his own safety." (Ital-
ics ours) 
The plain tiff was cross examined on the sub-
ject and admitted he was riding on a dangerous 
place. 
In arguing the case to the jury defense counsel 
argued that the minor was guilty of negligence in 
riding on the platform or running board or any 
other portion of the vehicle not designed for passen-
gers, and the plaintiff's attorney had full oppor-
tunity to answer the same. 
The plaintiff's attorney did not see fit to in-
clude with the record on appeal all of the instruc-
tions as in fact given by the court. The burden, of 
course, is upon him to show error in giving of the 
instruction, and he cannot make inferences from in-
structio~which he failed to include in the record 
on appeal. As a rna tter of fact, the insructions as 
originally given by the court outlined the plaintiff's 
theory in two of the plaintiff's requested instruc-
tions but wholly failed to cover in its instructions 
the contributing negligence in riding on a dangerous 
place on the vehicle which had been one of the de-
fendant's requests. It was for this reason that the 
court gave the additional instruction No. 14-A when 
he realized that the matter had not been covered in 
his instructions as given. In fact, the court would 
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have committed error had it failed to give the in-
struction No. 14-A. Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Section 41-6-108, provides as follows: 
"No person shall ride, 1and no person 
driving a motor vehicle shall knowingly per-
mit any person to ride, upon any portion of 
any vehicle not designed or intended for the 
use of passengers. * * * '' 
This is the matter to which the Instruction No. 14-A 
was directed. The plaintiff has not complained nor 
shown that this instruction was covered by other 
instructions and does not ·complain tba;t the instruc-
tion as given fails to state the law. 
While generally speaking instructions are all 
given at once, it is not uncommon to have instruc-
tions given at the close of arguments or out of order 
for some reason when either called to the 1attention 
of the court or when the court itself has discovered 
the necessity of giving the same. 
See 88 C.J.S., [Trial, Section 377, page 961, 
which reads as follows: · 
''A judge may modify or correct instruc-
tions at his own motion, and recall the jury 
for such purpose, or to amplify his charge, 
or to give additional instructions on mra:terial 
issues not covered by the original charge, pro-
vided the additional instruction or amplifica-
tion states the law and the facts correctly 
and covers a point not covered in the previous 
instructions. * * *" 
The court's other instructions specifically in-
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formed the jury that if in the various instructions 
any rule, direction, or idea was stated in varying 
ways, no emphasis thereon was intended and none 
should be inferred; that the jury was not to single 
out any certain sentence or any individual p_oint 
or instruction 'and ignore the others, but was to con-
sider all the instructions as a whole and was to re-
gard each in the light of all the others. The jury 
was further instructed that the order in which the 
instructions was given had no significance as to 
their relative importance. 
The pl1aintiff in his argument claims that after 
the plaintiff moimted the platform or running 
board, he was in fact practically a captive of the 
driver. This, of course, is compl~tely refuted by the 
plaintiff's own testimony in which he said that 
when the truck stopped at the stop sign, he had ample 
time to get off the truck but did not do so, not-
withstanding the fact that he knew it was a dan-
gerous place on which to ride. 
The fact that the defendant, Cloward, did not 
go back to aid the boy he saw lying in the street 
was clearly explained in his own testimony that 
he did not know any boy was riding on his vehicle 
after he left the stop sign and that he figured it 
was some other boy playing a youthful prank upon 
him. This was, of course, a question of fact for the 
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·The plaintiff's attorney also claims that there 
was prejudicial error as indicative of the fact that 
the jury found that $100.00 was all the damage to 
which the plaintiff minor was entitled and yet his 
special damages were $'82.50 which would only leave 
$17.50 for pain and suffering. This is not true 
and completely overlooks the fact that during the 
trial the father was added as a party plaintiff, and 
it was stipulated that if the plaintiff minor was en-
titled to recover anything, the court would award 
judgment to the father in addition thereto in the 
sum of $82.50. The jury's verdict of $100.00 for 
the general damages under the evidence in this case 
would not he classified as unreasonable and indica t-
ing any prejudice. Furthermore in view of its find-
ings on negligence and contributory negligence the 
amount awarded was immaterial. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case the defendant did not inform or 
intim'ate to the jury that he had no insurance on his 
vehicle at the time of the accident, but merely that 
he did not have any insurance on it at the time of 
the trial. Such statement, therefore, was not pre-
judicial. In any event, the plaintiff by his failure 
to examine the witness or take other 1action or move 
for a mistrial waived any objection which he might 
have to this statement. 
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The court's instruction No. 14-A correctly stated 
the law and was not covered by any other instruc-
tions. There was no prejudicial error in giving the 
same to the jury. It is, therefore, respectfully sub-
mitted that the case should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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